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ABSTRACT 
Security threats are of major concern in information sensitive mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) like emergency military 
communication networks. We propose a Proactive Information Security Management System (PISMS) framework with 
vulnerable path determination module (VPDM) for such mobile ad-hoc networks. The chief security officer can use it to 
identify the most vulnerable paths, so that they can be patched using suitable security technologies before the hackers 
actually attack and compromise them. Our PISMS computes (i) the probability of transitioning from each node to its adjacent 
neighbors, using two key indicators (angle and distance); (ii) number of steps required to reach a pre-determined destination 
from different sources using Markov model. The path that requires minimum number of steps to reach a destination is the 
most vulnerable path. This mechanism of identifying vulnerable path is incorporated as an integral part of the Information 
systems acquisition, development and maintenance (ISADM) module of ISMS framework ISO27001. 
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INTRODUCTION 
     Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are extremely susceptible to security breaches due to the ad-hoc and unpredictable 
nature of the network. Such networks do not have a clear line of defense. Moreover, as any intruder comes within the radio 
range of a node he can join the network and host malicious confidentiality, integrity and availability(C-I-A) attacks (Gupta 
and Ranga, 2012). Such intrusions can be devastating if they happen to occur on networks having sensitive information such 
as emergency military communications or emergency networks in hospitals (Hubaux, Buttyan and Capkyun, 2001). Due to 
these reasons it is important to devise a special Information Security Management System which can be used to prevent 
rather than detect and respond to intrusions in ad-hoc networks.  
      In this paper we propose a Proactive Information Security Management System (PISMS) having a vulnerable path 
determination module (VPDM) for mobile ad-hoc networks. We attempt to determine from a chief security officer’s (CSO) 
perspective, the number of steps required along different paths to reach a pre-determined destination node (eg. patient 
database in emergency hospital network) from different source nodes. The PISMS is based on finding multiple ways of 
moving from source to destination depending on direction based mobility. Multiple paths are crucial for ad-hoc networks as 
the nodes are not fixed and can change their position at any time (Tarique, Tepe, Adibi and Erfani, 2009). Our proposed 
VPDM for a MANET is aimed to enable CTOs to (i) identify and (ii) rank and (iii) patch the most vulnerable paths 
effectively so that security breaches can be minimized.  In this paper our PISMS uses the concepts of Markov Theory to 
compute for a MANET (i) the probability of transitioning from one node to the other in a MANET, (ii) the path of least 
resistance for a hacker from source(S) to target (T). This paper has 6 sections. Section 2 we discuss the related work. In 
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Section 3 we propose our PISMS model along with the research questions. In Section 4 and 5 the methodology for the study 
and the results are discussed. The conclusions are in Section 6. 
 
 
RELATED WORK 
 
Several studies have been conducted regarding the information security risk management in wired and wireless networks. 
Smith and Eloff (2006), assess the risk in a particular phase of the route followed by a patient admitted to a hospital for an 
operation using cognitive fuzzy logic approach (Smith and Eloff, 2000). Warren (2001) proposes the ODESSA framework of 
reviewing security within healthcare by using security profiling, data use and baseline security countermeasure while 
protecting the healthcare information system (Warren, 2001).  
But not many studies have been done on information security risk management in mobile ad-hoc networks because of the 
highly mobile nodes and the lack of a clear line of defense (Cai, Ming, Jing, Li and Liu, 2011). The few studies that have 
been done focus mainly on evaluating trust and reputation of communication between the nodes using either probability 
theory, fuzzy theory or grey relations projection theory. Zhang and Lee, (2000) devised a new architecture for intrusion 
detection in mobile ad-hoc networks. In this system, individual Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) agents are placed at each 
node. If an anomaly is detected then the local IDS collaborates with the neighboring IDS agents collectively forming an IDS 
system. There are six parts in this IDS system (Zhang and Lee, 2000). In 2001, Bhargava et al., proposed an Intrusion 
detection and Response Model (IDRM) for intrusion detection in adhoc networks. In this method each node uses 
neighborhood information to detect misbehavior of its neighbors. When the misbehavior count for a particular node exceeds a 
predetermined threshold, the information is sent to other nodes. The other nodes check their MALCOUNT index for the 
malicious node and update it (Bhargava and Agrawal, 2001). In 2004, Liu et al., proposed a dynamic trust model for mobile 
ad-hoc networks. The trust level of each node in the network is constantly updated based on reports from threat detection 
tools located at each of the nodes. The source node of a particular message selects the nodes which fulfill the required level of 
trust for the message. These nodes form the path for the message to pass (Liu, Joy and Thompson, 2004). Dai et al., (2009) 
proposed a fuzzy trust evaluation model based on classic fuzzy theory to model each node. This model also analyzes the 
physical requirements and psychology of malicious attackers (Dai, Jia and Kin, 2009). Cai et al (2011) proposed the 
Projection Pursuit Based Risk Assessment Method in mobile ad-hoc networks in order to calculate each node’s credibility in 
terms of risk value (Cai et al., 2011). Table 1 summarizes the various approaches to vulnerability assessment in ad-hoc 
networks. 
Table 1. Various Approaches to vulnerability assessment in ad-hoc networks 
Author Year Proposed Model Basis Methodology 
Zhang and  
Lee 
2000 IDS system 
Intrusion 
Detection 
New architecture where individual Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) agents are placed 
at each node 
Bhargava 
et al., 
2001 Intrusion detection and 
Response Model  
(IDRM). 
Each node uses neighbour hood information 
to predict abnormal behavior. 
Liu et al., 2004 Dynamic trust model. 
Trust 
The trust level of each node in the network 
is constantly updated based on reports from 
threat detection tools located at each of the 
nodes. 
Dai et al., 2009 Fuzzy trust evaluation 
model 
Uses classic fuzzy theory to model each 
node. Analyzes the physical requirements 
and psychology of malicious attackers. 
Cai et al., 2011 Projection Pursuit  
Based Risk  
Assessment Method 
 Calculates node’s credibility in terms of risk 
value 
 
       Based on the literature we observe that most of the studies focus on analyzing the risk of ad-hoc network considering 
trust or credibility of each node.  We propose a method to determine the vulnerability or the risk of the network from the 
perspective of the information security officer.  
         
PROPOSED MODEL 
We attempt to determine the paths requiring minimum number of steps to reach a pre-determined target from various sources 
in a wireless ad-hoc network using our proposed PISMS. These are the most vulnerable paths in the network and the CSO 
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can implement security technologies along this path in order to prevent it from being compromised easily. This mechanism 
for securing vulnerable paths can be incorporated as a module within the Security Policy of the organization and can be 
implemented in Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance(ISADM) module as part of IT Controls of 
ISMS framework ISO27001 as shown in Figure 1 (Broderick, 2006; Das, Mukhopadhyay and Shukla, 2013).  
                                                   ORGANIZATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             ISADM 
 
                                                
 
 
       
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed PISMS 
 
The inputs to our VPDM module include (i) adhoc mobile network structure of the organization, (ii) various possible targets 
that a hacker might use to compromise the health care database, (iii) Security policy and (iv) organization of IS . We assume 
that the organization has implemented perimeter security (firewall, IDS and anti-virus). Yet a smart malicious attacker would 
try to compromise the IT controls by skillfully exposing the vulnerabilities (Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mahanti and 
Sadhukhan, 2006). Our proposed VPDM will identify and rank the probable vulnerable routes/paths from the source to the 
target IS assets. Based on this input the CSO can patch the vulnerablities before being compromised. 
 
Vulnerable Path Determination Module (VPDM) for a MANET 
 
For vulnerability determination, the MANET is represented by a Non-orthogonal Cartesian System where the axes are 
inclined at 60° (Sadhukhan, Mandal, Bhaumik, and Saha, 2010). Each node may represent a data terminal equipment (DTE) 
such as a server, a workstation, a printer, a router etc. Each node is equipped with directional antennae which is steerable and 
can be rotated 360°. In such a network, a hacker can move in all six directions from his current node with equal probability 
(i.e., 1/6) (Camp, Boleng and Davies, 2002). However, in direction based mobility, probability of moving into adjacent nodes 
in a network is not uniform. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
Figure 2. Non-orthogonal Cartesian system representing an ad-hoc wireless network 
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Since we consider forward mobility, we assume that the attacker can move to only three nodes that conform to the forward 
direction, keeping its target in mind. Figure 2 shows a schematic diagram of a wireless ad-hoc network with the possible 
directions of movement according to our model. The source of the attacker can be any arbitrary node to which he gains 
access. We assume three nodes S1, S2, S3 which can act as source nodes from where the hacker can access the network. Let T 
be the destination node where the target (eg. Patient DB) is located. We try to determine the number of steps required to 
reach T from the different sources. The route followed would be one which provides the least resistance (i.e., maximum 
vulnerability) (Casey, 2006; Saxby, 1997). This is based on the Least Resistance Routing (LRR) algorithm for packet routing 
in ad-hoc networks (Pursley, 1999). From each source(S(a,b)), movement can only be made to adjacent nodes marked, X1(a-
1,b+1)  , X2(a,b+1)  and X3(a+1,b)  (Sadhukhan et al., 2008). Our research model answers two research questions. 
 
RQ1: Find the probability of transitioning from one node to the other in an emergency network, i.e., 
Find Transition Probability r(i,j) = f(A,D) 
          where A = Angle, D = Distance……..          (1) 
 
We propose two key criteria (indicators) to determine the transition probability to each adjacent node. Both criteria facilitate 
the attacker to choose the path of least resistance.  
 
Angle (A) between the source node, adjacent node and target node  
 
Figure 2. shows the derivation of angle probability from one node to its neighbor. This depends on the angle that the adjacent 
node makes with the line drawn from source to destination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Angle between the source (S), adjacent  nodes (X1, X2 and X3) and destination node (T). 
 
In Figure 3. movement can be made only to three destination nodes, X1, X2 and X3, from source node S. Let ST, represent 
the line from source to destination. As this is a hexagonal grid, value of angle X1SX3 = 120° Let us assume that  node X1 
makes an angle θ1, node X2 makes an angle θ2 and node X3 makes an angle θ3 with ST. The angle probability (pa) of moving 
to the next node is given by Eq (2): 
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                    Where, angle X1SX3 = 120° ; 120° ≤ θ1 + θ2 + θ3 ≤ 180°;  for k = 1 to 3 
The special cases of the angle probabilities for boundary conditions are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Special cases for boundary conditions 
Movement from a node Values of three θ’s Angle Probability 
to only to two adjacent nodes One θ out of the three possible θ’s is zero )3.......(
)(
1 3
1
∑
=
−=
k
k
k
kpa
θ
θ  
      such that angle X1SX3 = 60° 
 and 0° ≤ θ1 + θ2  ≤ 60°; 
 
 to only to one adjacent node Two θs out of the three possible θ’s are zero 1=kpa   ….               (4) 
such that angle X1SX3 = 0°
S 
(a, b) 
T
X1(a-1, b+1) 
X3(a+1, b) 
X2(a, b+1) 
θ 1 
θ 2 
θ 3 
(m, n) 
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Distance(D) 
 
The distance probability for any node is calculated between the final destination T(i0, j0)  and X1, X2 and X3, respectively. 
The formula for obtaining the distance between two nodes in a non-orthogonal Cartesian system has been stated in 
(Sadhukhan, Mandal and Saha, 2007). 
 The probability of transitioning from the current node to any of the three neighboring adjacent nodes is calculated by using 
an exponentially decreasing function represented by equation 6. This is inspired by the decay law in physical phenomenon  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Distance between the adjacent nodes(X1, X2 and X3) and destination node (T). 
that states that an event’s effect decreases exponentially to the distance of the event (Lu and Demirbas, 2011). This value is 
then normalized to get the final probability. Figure 4. shows the derivation of distance probability from one node to its 
neighbor. Let pd1, pd2 and pd3 be the distance probability of transitioning to nodes X1, X2 and X3 respectively. 
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   where  [k = 1 to 3]………..         (6) 
 
Transition Probability Calculation 
 
We assign weights to the two criteria Angle(A), Distance(D) depending on their relative importance using expert knowledge. 
Let the weights for A and D be W1, and W2 respectively (Das, Mukhopadhyay and Shukla, 2011).     
W1+W2 = 1    …..                (7) 
Now combining both the factors with their weights we can find the overall probability of moving from one node to its 
adjacent node using equations (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6). This overall transition probability (rbetween nodes (i1, j1) and (i2, 
j2) is given by: 
)8....(21 kkk pdWpaWr ×+×=  
 
RQ2: Find the path that requires minimum number of steps (U)  for a <source(S),target(T)> pair 
 
0  t at time  system  theof state  X  1;-n  t at time  system  theof state i  X 
n  t at time  system  theof state i  X   ;   ); p(X 
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Next we form the step 1 transition matrix of the  Markov model for each source-destination pair. This shows the probabilities 
of transitioning from each node to its three adjacent nodes, for the entire network. This transition probability value for each 
source-destination pair is obtained as the output of RQ1. Each node represents a state in the Markov process. Using Markov 
Model find the number of steps nj for each source Sj-T pair for which the probability of reaching the final destination from 
source Sj becomes to 1 according to equation (10).  
 
  Find   Pn |prn(S:T) =1……………………(10) 
        where  P = Transition Matrix at step 1. 
                     Pn = Transition Matrix at step n.             
 prn(S:T) = probability of reaching destination T from Source S at nth step 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
We simulate the entire network using a destination node and several possible source nodes using MATLAB R2009b as 
shown in Figure 2. Let T(m,n) and S(a,b) represent the destination node and source node respectively. Let us assume a 
database server containing sensitive patient information is placed at node T and S is a workstation that can be compromised 
easily by an external hacker. Each node is equipped with directional antennae which is steerable and can be rotated 360°. 
This can be used to measure the angle probability and distance probability of each node. We evaluate the network to find the 
number of steps to reach T from S primarily for three scenarios, (i) a<m, (ii)a=m and (iii)a>m. For each scenario we compute 
C as shown in Table 3. C is the difference between the x-coordinates of <S,T>. In the scenario where the x-coordinates of 
both S and T are the same, c is the difference of the y-coordinates of S and T.    
 
Table 3. Scenarios used in simulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The methodology followed by VPDM for each <source (Sj), Target (T)>  are as follows: 
Step 1: Generate original network using <S,T> pair  
Step 2: Calculate angle probability (pak)       
Step 3: Calculate distance probability (pdk)  
Step 4: Compute transition probability(r with the help of equation (8) 
Step 5: Generate step1 Transition matrix(P) using the transition probabilities (r  
Step 6: Find  number of steps (nj) required for <Sj ,T> using equation (10) using the Transition matrix (P) 
 
Then we select the source <Sj,T> pair for which nj is minimum. This path is patched first as it is the most vulnerable path. 
Similarly all the other paths between other <source-destination> pairs having n greater than a pre-determined threshold value 
for the network are patched in decreasing order of n.    The entire process is shown in the Step-Generation algorithm in 
Figure 5. 
 
Step-Generation (S(a,b); T(m,n); W1, W2 ) 
{ 
For each Source Sj 
{ 
    Adj = Compute_ adjacency _matrix (S,T) 
           { 
             M = Compute_ original _matrix(S,T)   /*Step 1: Generate original MANET*/ 
   { 
                   M = [a,b]; 
                  While a<>m and b<>n     
           a = a+1; N = [a,b];N = [M;N]; 
                        Compute original_matrix (S,T);  
           b = b+1; R = [a,b];R = [M;R]; 
SNo S(a,b) T(m,n) Case C 
1 (0,1) (1,4) a<m m-a=1 
2 (1,0) (1,4) a=m n-b =4 
3 (3,-2) (1,4) a>m a-m=2 
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          Compute original_matrix(S,T) ; 
          a = a-1; b = b+1, Q=[a,b];        
                   Q =[M;Q];Compute original_matrix(S,T) 
    End  
     M = [M; N; R;Q]                                                  /*Original matrix*/ 
    } 
                M = B       /* Replicate matrix m*/ 
                W = size (B, 1)     /* Calculate no. of rows in B*/ 
For i = 1 to W 
        For J = 1 to W 
             IF ((B (i, 1) ==K(j,1))&&     /*Move to adjacent node X2*/ 
                   (B (i, 2) == (K(j,2)-1)))  
                                  adj(i,j) = 1;  
                          EndIF 
                     
                          IF((B(i,1)==(K(j,1)+1))&     /*Move to adjacent node X1*/ 
                 (B(i,2)==(K(j,2)-1)))  
                                adj(i,j) = 1; 
                         ENDIF 
                    
                         IF ((B(i,1)==(K(j,1)-1))&&    /*Move to adjacent node X3*/ 
                (B(i,2)==(K(j,2))))  
                               adj(i,j) = 1; 
                         ENDIF 
                      END  
               END  
               } 
               prAM=Compute_Angle_Pr_Matrix(S,T)   /*Step 2: Calculate Angle Probability*/ 
                         { 
           IF a<m 
                               c=m-a 
                  Calculate Angle_matrix 
                          ELSEIF a=m 
                                         c=n-b 
                           Calculate Angle_ matrix 
                          ELSE 
                                        c=a-m 
                           Calculate Angle_matrix 
                          ENDIF 
                Compute pram     /*angle probability matrix*/ 
             } 
               prDist=Com_Dist__Pr_Matrix(prAM, T)   /*Step 3: Calculate distance Probability*/ 
                          {  
             Calculate Distance_matrix 
             Calculate prDist     /*Dist pr matrix*/ 
           } 
 F = [prAM prDist];    /* Step 4: Compute transition probability matrix */ 
              P = [W1 W2]*F;      /*Step 5:Compute transition probability matrix*/ 
n= Pn |prn(S: T)=1    /*Step 6: Find no of steps  (S to T)*/ 
            END  
            } 
     U = [U; n];      /*Matrix containing nj for each <Sj,T>*/ 
     U = SORT (U)      /*Sort U in descending order*/ 
} 
Figure 5. Step Generation Algorithm 
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RESULTS 
 
We know discuss the results of our VPDM model based on the simulations carried out. We (i) simulated multiple MANETs  
(ii) computed the transition matrix, and (iii) determined the most vulnerable paths that an hacker may exploit to reach the 
destination. 
 
Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) 
 
 The generation of the MANET corresponds to step 1 of the VPDM. Figure 6 illustrates the MANET for one source-
destination pair <S(0,1),T(1,4)>, illustrated by Case 1 in Table 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. MANET  diagram for <S(0,1),T(1,4)> pair 
 
Transition Matrix 
 
We compute the transition probability (r from each node for a hacker for the MANET shown in Figure 6, using (i) Angle 
probability (pak), (ii) distance probability (pdk) and  (iii) assuming constant weightage of 0.4 for A and 0.6 for D in equation 
8. These correspond to Steps 2, 3 and 4 of VPDM respectively.  As shown in Figure 6, the hacker can move along any of the  
11 nodes of the MANET to reach from the S to T. Each of these nodes represents a stage in the Markov model. According to 
Markov theory we calculate the value of N for which the final probability of moving from S to T is 1. Table 4 shows the Step 
1 transition matrix, P1, obtained using equation (8). This corresponds to Step 5 of VPDM. 
Table 4. (11X11) Step 1 transition matrix ( P1) 
      T 
S 
 (0,1) (0,2) (1,1) (0,3) (1,2) (2,1) (0,4) (1,3) (2,2) (2,3) (1,4) 
(0,1) 0.00 0.57 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0,2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(1,1) 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0,3)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(1,2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.37 0.00 0.00 
(2,1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 
(0,4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
(1,3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.52 
(2,2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.49 0.00 
(2,3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
(1,4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
Figure 7 represents the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) showing initial transition probability for <S(0,1),T (1,4)> pair. The 
arcs represent the transition probability (P) values that are arrived by equation 10 and also shown in Table 3. 
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Figure 7. DAG showing transition probabilities 
 
We next list the different paths along with the probabilities of all the links along the path for each <S,T> pair. Table 5 shows 
the probabilities of all the paths that require 4 hopes to move from <S(0,1),T (1,4)>. The probability to reach from source to 
destination <S(0,1),T (1,4)> in 4 hops is 0.34. 
 
Table 5.  Probabilities of all the paths that require 4 hops to move from S to T <S(0,1),T (1,4)>. 
Paths with four links Link Probabilities Path Probability 
(0,1) (0,2) 
 
 
(0,3) 
(0,4)  (1,4) 0.57 * 0.56 * 0.75 * 1 0.2300 
(1,3)  (1,4) 0.57 * 0.56 * 0.25 * 0.53 0.0400 
(1,2)  (1,3)  (1,4) 0.57 * 0.44 * 0.25 * 0.53 0.0330 
(0,1) (1,1) (1,2)  (1,3)  (1,4) 0.43 * 0.41 * 0.25 * 0.53 0.0234 
Total probability of all 4 hop paths 0.3400 
 
Table 6 illustrates the Step 4 transition matrix, (P4) obtained using equation (8). Blank squares indicate a probability of 0.00. 
We note that the total probability value of all 4 hop paths (0.34) as arrived in Table 5, tallies with the probability value as 
computed by the Step 4 transition matrix P4 as shown in  row1, col 11(S(0,1) T(1,4)) of Table 6. We have shaded the field 
in Table 6. 
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Table 6. (11X11) Step 4 transition matrix P4 
    T 
S 
 (0,1) (0,2) (1,1) (0,3) (1,2) (2,1) (0,4) (1,3) (2,2) (2,3) (1,4) 
(0,1)    0.04   0.20 0.20 0.04 0.18 0.34 
(0,2)       0.01   0.04 0.94 
(1,1)       0.11 0.08  0.16 0.65 
(0,3)            1.00 
(1,2)            1.00 
(2,1)       0.02   0.05 0.94 
(0,4)           1.00 
(1,3)           1.00 
(2,2)           1.00 
(2,3)           1.00 
(1,4)           1.00 
Blank squares = 0.00 
Table 7. Probabilities of all the paths that require 7 hopes to move from S to T. 
Paths with seven links Link Probabilities Path Probability 
(0,1) (1,1) (0,2) (1,2) (0,3)  (1,3)  (0,4)  (1,4) 0.43*0.29*0.44*0.38*0.25*0.11*1 0.0050 
(0,1) (1,1) (0,2) (1,2) (2,2)  (1,3)  (2,3)(1,4) 0.43*0.29*0.44*0.37*0.51*0.36*1 0.0037 
(0,1) (1,1) (0,2) (1,2) (0,3)  (1,3)  (2,3)  (1,4) 0.43*0.29*0.44*0.38*0.25*0.36*1 0.0018 
(0,1) (1,1) (0,2) (1,2) (2,2)  (1,3)  (0,4)  (1,4) 0.43*0.29*0.44*0.37*0.51*0.11*1 0.0010 
(0,1) (1,1) (2,1) (1,2)  (0,3)  (1,3)  (0,4)  (1,4) 0.43*0.30*0.46*0.38*0.25*0.11*1 0.0006 
(0,1) (1,1) (2,1) (1,2)  (2,2)  (1,3)(2,3)(1,4) 0.43*0.30*0.46*0.37*0.51*0.36*1 0.0040 
(0,1) (1,1) (2,1) (1,2) (0,3)  (1,3)  (2,3)(1,4) 0.43*0.30*0.46*0.38*0.25*0.36*1 0.0020 
(0,1) (1,1) (2,1) (1,2) (2,2)  (1,3)  (0,4)(1,4) 0.43*0.30*0.46*0.37*0.51*0.11*1 0.0012 
Total probability of 7 hops 0.0200 
Table 7 shows the probabilities of all the paths that require 7 hopes to move from Source S to Destination T. The summation 
of the probabilities of the all the paths that require 7 hops from source to destination is 0.02. The cumulative probability of 
reaching destination T(1,4) from source S(0,1) in 7 hops is 1 or destination T(1,4) can be reached from source S(0,1) in 
maximum 7 steps. This number also appears in the Step 7 transition matrix P7 as shown in Table 8 in the cell from S(0,1) 
T(1,4). We have shaded the field in Table 8. 
Table 8. (11X11) Step 7 transition matrix P7 
      T 
S 
 (0,1) (0,2) (1,1) (0,3)  (1,2) (2,1) (0,4) (1,3) (2,2) (2,3) (1,4) 
(0,1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(0,2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1,1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(0,3)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1,2)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(2,1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(0,4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1,3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(2,2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(2,3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1,4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Ranking Vulnerable Paths 
 
Since the probability of reaching the destination T(1,4) from the source S(0,1) in 4 steps (i.e., (0,1) (0,2) (0,3)  (0,4) 
 (1,4)) is the highest (i.e., 0.23) compared to the probabilities of all other paths, therefore we conclude that minimum 
number of steps to reach the destination T(1,4) from the source S(0,1) is 4.This corresponds to step 6 of VPDM. Figure 8. 
shows the probabilities and cumulative probabilities of moving from source S to destination T in N steps. The minimum 
number of steps required to reach from S to T is 4. This has a probability of 0.34. The probability of moving from S to T in 5 
steps is 0.48 and the cumulative probability of reaching T from S in 5 steps is 0.82. Similarly, probability of moving from S 
to T in 7 steps is 0.02 and the cumulative probability of reaching T from S in 7 steps is 1. Thus, maximum number of steps 
required to move from S to T is 7. 
 
Figure 8. Probability of reaching T from S in N steps 
 
Table 9 ranks the five most vulnerable paths in our network. The most vulnerable path is the one that has the highest 
probability of moving from < S,T>. 
 
Table 9. Most vulnerable paths in our network 
Rank Path No. of steps (N) Probability 
1 (0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,4)  (1,4) 4 0.2300 
2 (0,1) (0,2) (1,2) (0,3)  (0,4)  (1,4) 5 0.0700 
3 (0,1) (1,1) (0,2) (0,3)  (0,4)  (1,4) 5 0.0524 
4 (0,1) (0,2) (1,2)  (2,2)  (2,3)  (1,4) 5 0.0455 
5 (0,1) (0,2)  (0,3) (1,3)  (1,4) 4 0.0400 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
 
This study provides a novel approach to the problem of information security breaches and data thefts in organizations using 
MANETs. Every organization implements perimeter security in form of firewall, IDS and anti-virus. Yet a smart malicious 
attacker would try to compromise the IT controls by skillfully exposing the vulnerabilities. Our proposed PISMS having a 
VPDM can be used by a chief security officer (CSO) to determine and rank most vulnerable paths in the network so that 
security technologies can be implemented along such paths in order to prevent them from being compromised easily. This 
mechanism for securing vulnerable paths can be incorporated as a module within the Security Policy of the organization and 
can be implemented in ISADM module as part of IT Controls of ISMS framework ISO27001.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
   Security threats are of major concern in MANETs due to the mobility and unpredictability of the nodes. Such threats can 
wreak havoc in information sensitive networks like emergency military communication networks. Hence, it is important to 
devise a PISMS which caters specifically to mobile ad-hoc networks.  We propose a PISMS that identifies the most 
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vulnerable paths in the network using VPDM. We compute (a) the probability of transitioning from each node to its adjacent 
neighbours using key indicators (angle and distance) (b) the number of steps to reach a pre-determined destination from 
different sources using Markov theory. The path that requires minimum number of steps to reach the destination is most 
vulnerable. This mechanism of identifying vulnerable paths can be incorporated as an integral part of the ISADM module of 
ISMS framework ISO27001.Using this PISMS the CSO can identify security loopholes along the highly vulnerable paths, so 
that they can be patched before the hackers actually attack and compromise them.   
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